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LABOR RELATIONS

LABOR RELATIONS-A NATIONAL OR A STATE
PROBLEM
A Study of the Conflict in Jurisdiction Between the National
Labor Relations Act and the Minnesota Labor Relations Act
By GERALD HEANEY*

W

I.

INTRODUCTION

HEN the National Labor Relations Act' was passed in 1935,
there were no similar state acts in existence. It was not long,
however, until agitation for such legislation was commenced, and
in 1937, state labor acts modeled after the federal act were enacted
in Massachusetts, 2 New York, 3 Pennsylvania 4 Utah,' and Wisconsin.8 Since then, state labor acts have been passed in Michigan-

and Minnesota."
The demand for such legislation has continued, and, according to a survey of state legislatures, thirty-eight of which were
in session in February, 1941, bills relating to labor relations
were before twenty-seven of them.
A total of thirteen states were considering some form of
labor relations acts, nine of which were patterned after the
Wagner Act, while three embodied the Garrison suggestion that
units should not be established where rival units disagree on the
type appropriate. The thirteen states are: California, 9 Connecticut,
Illinois, Maryland, 10 Minnesota, 1 Nebraska, New Hampshire,
*Attorney at Law, St. Paul, Minn.
'Mason's U. S. Code, July 1935 supp., tit. 29, secs. 61-76, 29 U. S. C. A.
secs. 151-166, 9 F. C. A. tit.29, secs. 151-166.
2
Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves 1937, ch. 436.
31 New York, Laws (Thompson 1939) ch. 31, art. 20.
4Pennsylvania,
Laws 1937 no. 294.
5
Utah, Laws 1937, ch. 55.
6
Wisconsin, Stat. (1937) ch. 111.
7Michigan, Public Acts, 176, 1939.
SMason's Minn. Supp. 1940, sec. 4254 (20-40) as amended ch. 469, Laws
of 1941.
9This state also has bills before its state legislature restricting union
activities, picketing, and coercion.
'OThere is also a bill establishing a division of conciliation requiring a
ten-day notice before a strike can be called, and similar in other respects to
the Minnesota act.
"This bill has failed to obtain committee approval. Departmental requests for amendments are: (1) a provision limiting the time a strike notice
is valid to ninety days; (2) an amendment to see. 7, providing that if the
governor does not appoint members of the public service commission within
five days after notification to him by the conciliator the limitations imposed
on the parties by sec. 7, shall be inoperative; (3) an amendment to sec. 14,
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New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, 12 Texas, and
Wyoming.
On the other hand, at least four states have before them only
proposals to restrict union activities. The so-called equalizing
statutes forbidding unfair practices of employees, very common
two years ago, are conspicuous by their absence.
With this rapid increase in state legislation, the question as
to the relative jurisdiction of the national and state acts is becoming increasingly important. The existing state enactments
have taken care of this problem in various ways. The Massachusetts act 13 is expressly not applicable to unfair labor practices
subject to the national act; the Pennsylvania act' 4 does not apply
to employers subject to the national act; and the New York act'
does not apply to employees of any employer who concedes to and
agrees with the state labor board that such employees are subject
to the national act. The Michigan,' Wisconsin,' Utah,' and
Minnesota" acts are silent on this question.
This jurisdictional question has been considered by the Wisconsin supreme court in two cases, 20 in which it was held that the
providing that no temporary restraining orders shall be issued unless the
same are returnable within seven days from the time they are granted. It
is also the duty of the court under this amendment to give such suits recedence over all other civil suits which are ready for trial. Failure of the
trial court to decide a motion for a temporary injunction within sixty
days shall dissolve any restraining order. Failure of the trial court to
decide any suit brought under this section within forty-five days shall
dissolve any restraining order or temporary injunction issued therein without further order of the court; (4) a provision giving the conciliator power
to subpoena witnesses in representation cases; (5) an addition to the unfair
practices sections making it an unfair practice for either employers or
employees to violate a collective bargaining agreement. These amendments are contained in Senate file no. 468, and were introduced by Senator
Galvin. They have been reported back with approval from the committee on
labor. All of these amendments have been enacted into law (ch. 469, Laws
of 1941). In addition, sec. 12 was amended so as to make it an unfair
practice to lock out employees who have given information or testimony
under the act.
"The Rhode Island bill is the only one which was finally approved.
This was approved May 7, 1941, and became effective July 1, 1941.
"3Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves 1937, ch. 436, see. 14 (b) ; see note
in (1939) 27 Cal. L. Rev. 438.
:41 Pennsylvania Laws 1937, no. 294, sec. 3 (c)
Amended Laws 1939
no. 162; Pa. Op. Atty. Gen. (1937) no. 229, p. 57.
11 New York, Laws (Thompson 1939) ch. 31, art. 20, sec. 715.
loMichigan, Public Acts 1939, ch. 178.
"Wisconsin, Stat. (1937) ch. 111.
'sUtah,
Laws 1937, ch. 55.
19 Mason's Minn. Supp. 1940, sec. 9254 (20-40).
2OWisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co.
(1938) 228 Wis. 473, 279 N. W. 673, 117 A. L. R. 398 and note; Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board v. Bradley, (1941) 237 Wis. 164, 295 N. W.
791.
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State Labor Relations Board could act even though the industries
were engaged in interstate commerce. 2 1 In Pennsylvania the State
Labor Board2 2 has held that it will not be bound by the determination of the national board that an employer is engaged in interstate commerce. In Massachusetts" it has been decided that a
company doing a business that was local in nature, but which
did some interstate business and was financed by the General
Motors Corporation, was within the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts board. Also, the New York board has decided2' that it
could exercise jurisdiction over industries in interstate commerce until the national board had assumed jurisdiction in the
particular case. The fact that the employers conceded that they
were subject to the national act did not divest the state board of
jurisdiction.
It can be seen from the above r~sum6 that there are troubled
waters ahead. The Supreme Court of the United States has not
yet considered the problem, but with the rapid growth of state
acts and other measures dealing with labor, the question is one
-1The first case arose under the earlier act cited in footnote seventeen,
and the second under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act. Laws 1939,
ch. 57. See also Plankinton v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Local No.
122, case no. 78, c. w. 4, Feb. 15, 1940, 5 L. R. f.650.
22
1n re Union Premier Food Stores, Inc. v. Madnick, (1939) case no.
142, Oct. 10, 1939, Penn. Labor Rd. Board, 5 L. R. Mt. 642. Ninety per cent
of the raw materials came from other states, and sixty-seven of the finished
products were sent to warehouses in other states. The National Labor Relations Board had taken jurisdiction in representation proceedings involving
stores in the same chain. The Pennsylvania board said: "Although the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board has the highest respect for the deliberations and determinations of the National Labor Relations Board, it does not
feel constrainedt to accept such action by the National Labor Relations
Board as conclusive upon the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, especially where, as here, the question of jurisdiction was
resolved by the simple expedient of a stipulation of the parties to that
effect. In the nature of respondent's operations, it is difficult to see how
that which touches only one store or one community can have the direct
effect upon interstate commerce which, under the decisions and the National
Labor Relations Act, give the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction.
When the merchandise is received at each store for local consumption, to all
intents- and purposes it has come to rest and any interstate features of' respondent operations, even if such were the test, have completely ceased. Cf.
In re Win. Flaccus Oak Leather Co. v. International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local No. 75, case no. 204, Oct. 17, 1939, 5 Labor Relations Manual 644.
23
1n re Back Bay Chevrolet, Inc. v. Local No. 393, case no. U. P. 46,
.Mar. 1, 1938, Mfass. Labor Relations Board, 5L. R. If.640.
24
Davega City Radio, Inc. v. State Labor Relations Board, (1939) 281
N. Y. 13, 22 N. E. (2nd) 145, discussed in (1940) 24 AIwssorA LAw
REvIEw 277; In re General Bakery Co. v. General Bakery Wrorkers Union,
Local No. 1, case S. E. 829, May 25, 1938, 2 L. R. f.571; George B.
Wheeler v. Bleachers, Dyers and Finishers and Printers, Local No. 790,
case no. S. V. 2805, July 21, 1939.
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that may profitably be examined. The purpose of this article is
to point out some of the issues that must be considered before
the courts can arrive at a conclusion.
In laying a foundation for this discussion the purpose and
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act must first
be considered.
II.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL
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ACT

The National Labor Relations Act& recites in section one that:
"The refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining leads to strikes and industrial unrest;
"Experience has proved that protection by law of the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the
flow of commerce. Therefore:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate 'these obstructions to the free flow of commerce, when they have occurred,
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection."

Within this recital can be found the real purpose of Congress
in passing the National Labor Relations Act, i.e., to encourage
collective bargaining between employers and workers and to
remove certain important sources of industrial unrest engendered
by the denial of the right of employees to organize and by the
refusal of employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining.2 6 The president, on approving the act, clearly recognized this
purpose when he said:
25Mason's U. S. Code, July 1935 supp., tit. 29, secs. 61-76, 29 U. S. C. A.
secs. 26151-166, 9 F. C. A. tit. 29, secs. 151-166.

House Report no. 1147, 74th Congress, Committee on Labor, June 10,
1935, page 8. See Geffs and Hepburn, The Wagner Labor Act Cases,
(1937)

22 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 2;

Warm, A Study

of the Judicial

Attitude Towards Trade Unions and Labor, (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAW
REvIEW 255, 351.
There is a difference in opinion as to whether the preamble is a part of
the statute, State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court for Thurston County,
(1916) 92 Wash. 16, 159 Pac. 92 (holding it is) but cf. Commonwealth v.
Smith, (1882) 76 Va. 477; but that fact does not seem to have affected
the use that the courts have made of the preamble. It is the generally accepted canon that it cannot be resorted to where the language of the act
is unambiguous. Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. Murray, [1931] A. C. 126, 36 Com.
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"A better relationship between labor and management is the
high purpose of this act. By assuring the employees tile right of
collective bargaining, it fosters the development of the employment contract on a sound and equitable basis. By providing an
orderly procedure for determining who is entitled to represent
employees, it aims to remove one of the chief causes of wasteful
economic strife. By preventing practices which tend to destroy
the independence of labor it seeks for every worker within its
scope, that freedom of choice and action which is justly his."27The authority for the enactment of the statute was found in
the commerce clause of the United States constitution,2s and is
based on the theory that strikes in many businesses burden interstate or foreign commerce and that the federal government may
therefore legislate to remove such burdens.20
As the act is based on this theory, it does not cover all industry and labor, but is applicable only when a violation of the
legal right of independent self-organization would burden or
obstruct interstate commerce. The courts have, however, recognized that Congress wished to regulate the unfair labor practices
enumerated and to protect the right to bargain collectively to the
30
full extent of its constitutional power to regulate commerce.
The question is, How far does the power of the national
government extend, since every activity imaginable can be said to
Cas. 159; Alert Building & Loan Ass'n of City of Newark, (1938)

120

N. J. L. 397, 199 AUt. 738, but the courts often pay only lip worship to the
canon and proceed to find an ambiguity where none, in fact, appears to
exist. Huntworth v. Tanner, (1915) 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523, Ann. Cas.
1917D 676. If the court adopts the mischief approach to statutory construction, it is free to use the preamble even though no ambiguity exists to find
the purpose of the enactment or as an indication of the pre-legislative history
of the enactment. The United States Supreme Court in construing the
National Labor Relations Act has adopted the mischief approach. See footnote 104. For a general discussion of the use of preambles, see Note, (1941)
25 MiNxEsorA LAW REWvEw 924.
27First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board (1935) 9.
2
SGibbon v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 1; National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., (1937) 301 U. S. 1,
57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1352 and note; see Note, (1940)
24 MINESOTA LAv R vnEv 940, and Fansteel Metallurgical Co. v. Lodge

66, 295 Ill. ADp. 323, 14 N. E. (2d) 175, aff'd 306 U. S.240, 59 Sup. Ct. 990,

83 L. Ed. 627.
2 See footnote 28. The foundation of this doctrine has been laid in a'
long series of previous decisions; Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939)
252-270;
(1940) 24 MINNESOTA LAw REvIW 940, 947.
30
"The act on its face thus evidences the intention of Congress to exercise whatever power is constitutionally given to it to regulate commerce
by the adoption of measures for the protection or control of certain specified
acts, unfair labor practices, which provoke or tend to provoke strikes or
labor disturbances affecting interstate commerce." National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, (1939) 306 U. S.601, 59 Sup. Ct. 668, 83 L. Ed.
1014.
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affect interstate commerce in some manner?
Chief Justice Hughes has said :31
"Whatever terminology is used, the criterion is necessarily
one of degree and must be so defined. This does not satisfy those
who seek for mathematical certainty or rigid formulas. But such
formulas are not provided by the great concepts of the constitution, such as interstate commerce, due process, and equal protection. In maintaining the balance of constitutional grants and
limitations, it is inevitable that we should define their application
in the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion."
Thus, all that can be done is to draw inferences from the
decided cases and try to discern the trend in the attitude of the
present court. 2
It is apparent from the recent decisions and the declarations
of the court that the tendency is to extend and increase the powers
of the federal government with regard to economic activities,
especially in the field of labor relations.83 This extension is due
in part to the absence of state legislation protecting the rights of
employees, but it is also in part based upon the idea that the
problem is national in scope and requires uniformity of regulation.3 4 This fact is recognized not only by the courts, but also by
those engaged in administering the acts. Thus, Father Haas, a
noted labor conciliator, speaking before the International Association of Governmental Officials of the need for a national labor
board, said:
"To achieve this result, the National Labor Relations Board
3lSanta Cruz Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (1938)
303 U. S.453, 467, 58 Sup. Ct. 656, 82 L. Ed. 954.
32(1940) 24 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 940.
3
3United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co., (1941) 312 U. S. 100,
61 Sup. Ct. 451. Mulford v. Smith, (1939) 307 U. S. 38, 59 Sup. Ct. 648,
83 L. Ed. 1092; where the Supreme Court upheld the principle of limiting
interstate trade to a federally determined national marketing quota; ef.
Chas. C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, (1937) 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct.
883, 81 L. Ed. 1279; Helvering v. Davis, (1937) 301 U. S.619, 57 Sup. Ct.
904, 81 L. Ed. 1307; White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1939) 27-28, 142-163; Woody, The Growth of the Federal Government; Rottschaefer, The Constitution and a "Planned Economy," (1940) 38
Mich. L. Rev. 1133, 1150. Professor Rottschaefer says:
"The Labor Board Act decisions, however, reveal a distinctive trend
towards determining the existence of the appropriate connection between
local activities and interstate commerce by accepting an organic view of
the nature of our economic system. If with this there be coupled the trend
towards according congressional decisions a higher degree of deference
than has been the wont of courts at some periods in the past, the likelihood
is very great that direct enactment of many of the rules regulating competition that were found in the code will be sustained for many businesses and
activities that are neither interstate commerce nor a part of the current
of such commerce."
34
See cases cited in footnotes 26, 27, and 28.
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is and will continue to be a necessary instrument to preserve
collective bargaining standards horizontally across state lines and
to abolish standard-corroding competition between states and between each state and the federal government."
And Paul Herzog, a member of the New York State Labor
Relations Board, speaking of the conflict between the national
act and the New York act, gave his opinion, saying:
"Obviously, all of us feel that the job is a job that should be
done, if possible, on a national scale, and no one on the New
York State Board desires to assert the board's jurisdiction to
the prejudice of the national board."3 5
It' thereby becomes apparent that the trend is to extend the
power of the federal government in labor relations. This fact is
more clearly brought out by an enumeration of the following
industries in which the national board has assumed jurisdiction,
and in which the courts have sustained the action of the board:
1. Busihesses engaged in interstate transportatim and communication.36 This concept has been extended to certain intrastate employees of these companies, such as dockwvorkers,17 shopmen,3 8 and repair and maintenance workers.3 9 The act also applies to local express or pick-up companies which handle interstate shipments and complete the last stage of the journey,40 and
to intrastate and local agencies of commerce which also handle
4
interstate shipments, since the same facilities are used for both. L
2. Intrastate industries upon which the agencies of interstate commerce are dependent.42
-5Proceedings of the 23d convention of the International Association of
Governmental
Labor Officials, Department of Labor Bulletins 653.
36
Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, (1937) 301 U. S. 142, 57 Sup. Ct. 648, 81 L. FA. 965. See (1940) 24
MIN-ESOTA LAW REVIEw 940, 955; First Annual Report of the National
Labor Relations Board (1935). Extensive discussions of the scope of the
National Labor Relations Act will be found in Donoho, jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board, and The Developing Concept of Interstate Commerce, (1938) 6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 436; Muller, Businesses
Subject to the National Labor Relations Act, (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1286;
State3 and Federal Labor Boards, (1939) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 558.
7Buyer v. Guillan, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1921), 271 F. 65.
sUnited States v. Railway Employees, (D. Ill. 1923) 290 Fed. 987.
39
Washington, Va. and Md. Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations

Board, (1937) 301 U. S. 142, 57 Sup. Ct. 648, 11 L. Ed. 965; In the Matter
of Ira
40 S. Bushey & Sons. Inc., (1937) 3 Nat'l Labor Rd. Rep. 716.
Tn the Matter of Wald Transfer and Storage Co., (1937) 3 Nat'l
Labor Rel. Rep. 712; In the Matter of Houston Cartage Co., Inc., (1937) 2
Nat'l41Labor Rel. Rep. 1000.

' United States v. Workingmans Amal. Council, (D. La. 1893) 54 Fed.

944; Toledo Transfer Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
(D. Ohio,
1925) 7 Law and Labor 33.
42 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (1938)
305 U. S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126.
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3. Manufacturing or processing industries, (a) which receive a substantial portion of their raw materials from other
states and which ship out a substantial part of the finished
products;3 (b) which obtain their materials from a local source
but ship a substantial portion of the finished products to other
states;" (c) which obtain goods from extra-state sources but
4
sell locally. 5
The ultimate test in all cases, as laid down in the JonesLaughlin Case and reaffirmed in the Santa Cruz Case, is whether
the stoppage of operations by industrial strife would result in a
substantial interruption of, or burden upon, interstate commerce. 40
The decisions leave no doubt that neither the character of the
enterprise involved, nor its size, nor the number of men employed,
nor the nature of the commodities produced or services rendered
is a controlling factor in determining whether the act may be
47
applied in a given situation.
The fact that the intrastate activities outweigh the interstate
activities in volume or importance, 4 or that the industry is not
of national importance, will not make the employer's business
immune from regulation.49 Nor is the tendency to obstruct lessened merely because the merchandise which the manufacturer
ships is that of a consignee or of a customer in other states.
In connection with the scope of the act, it is important to note
that the finding of jurisdiction by the board in any case is given
great weight and will not be overturned if "a reasonable mind
43National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., (1937) 301
U. S.49, 57 Sup. Ct. 642, 81 L. Ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1352; National Labor
Relations Board v. Friedman Harry Marks Clothing Co., (1937) 301 U. S.
58, 57 Sup. Ct. 645, 81 L. Ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1375; National Labor
Relations Board v. Fainblatt, (1939) 306 U. S. 601, 59 Sup. Ct. 668, 83
L. Ed. 10; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp.,
(1937) 301 U. S.1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1352.
44Santa Cruz Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (1938)
303 U. S.453, 58 Sup. Ct. 656, 82 L. Ed. 954.
45National Labor Relations Board v. A. S. Abell Co., (1939) 97 Fed.
(2d) 951; Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 841, reversed
as to other issues and board orders enforced in full, (1939) 308 U. S.241,
60 Sup. Ct. 203, 84 L. Ed. 219.
46See Muller, Businesses Subject to the National Labor Relations Act,
(1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1286.
47Second Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board,
(1937) 52.
4"National Labor Relations Board v. A. S. Abell Co., (1939) 97 F.
(2d) 951, 954.
4"National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, (1939) 306 U. S.
601, 59 Sup. Ct. 668, 83 L. Ed. 10. This case also decided that the title
to the goods was not a determinative factor in saying that the National
Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction in a particular case.
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might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion, or it affords
a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue might be
inferred.150 In fact, during 1938 no decisions of the board were
set aside for lack of jurisdiction, and in 1939 only one was thus
set aside. 51
No industries from Minnesota were involved in actual litigation either under the unfair practices sections or under the sections dealing with representation until 1939. In that year the
Cudahy- Packing Co., 52 the Hamilton Brown Shoe Co.,53 Wilson
and Co., 54 Montgomery Ward and Co., 55 and the American
Radiator Co.56 came before the circuit court of appeals of the
eighth circuit. Other industries in this state where the national
board has acted include: Minneapolis Moline,75 Swift and Co..s
Koppers Coke Co.,5" and Paper, Calmenson and Co.60
The only limitation 6' on the power of the federal government
under the National Labor Relations Act was indicated in the
Jones-Laughlin Case,62 in which the court declared:
"Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in
the light of our dual system of government and may not be
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that to embrace them in view of our complex society would effectually obliterate the distinction between
5oColumbia Enameling Co. v. The National Labor Relations Board,

(1938) 306 U. S. 292, 59 Sup. Ct. 501, 83 L. Ed. 660.
51Fourfli Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board (1939)
112. In National Labor Relations Board v. Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp.,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 129, the court held the defendant not
to be within Ih act. even though its equipment had its origin in other
states,
52 and the gold it.ined was shipped outside the state.

Cudahy Pack:ng Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 7th

Cir. 1939) 102 F. (21) 383.

53Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A.
8th Cir.
1939) 104 F. (2d) 49.
54
Wilson and Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1939)55 103 F. (2d) 243.
ontgoniery Ward and Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,

(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 147.
5GAmerican Radiator Co. -. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1939) 102 F (2d) 974.
57(1939) 15 Nat'l Labor Rel. Rep. 79.
5s(1939) 15 Nat'l Labor Rel. Rep. 110.
59(1939)

14 Nat'l Labor Rel. Rep. 87.

60(1938) 10 Nat'l Labor Rel. Rep. 17.
61

The Minnesota act has been held applicable to the following industries
which would undoubtedly come within the jurisdiction of the National Labor

Relations Board: St. Cloud Bus Lines and Raymond Bros. Transfer Co.,

Koppers Coke Co., Northern States Power Co., The Interstate Iron Co.,
The Evergreen Mining Co., Fairibault Woolen Mills Co., The Transfer
in Minneapolis, and many others.
Companies
62
.National Labor Relations Board v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., (1937)

301 U. S.1, 57 Sup. Ct. 624, 84 L. Ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1352.
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what is national and what is local, and create a completely centralized government."
III. EFFECT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT UPON
STATE LABOR LEGISLATION

It is in consideration of the effect of the National Labor
Relations Act upon state labor legislation that the chief problem
arises, but it is inevitable as long as we continue to operate under
a dual system of government such as ours. In settling this conflict the constitutional principles that have been developed are
relatively clear.
Even in the absence of federal legislation in matters of
national concern (those requiring uniformity of regulation) the
power to regulate interstate commerce is vested exclusively in
63
and state action is excluded. State action is also
Congress,
excluded if it would unduly burden or discriminate against inter6
but the state under its police power may enact
state commerce,
affairs which affect commerce of national
local
governing
laws

import.

65

An exercise by Congress of its commerce power, by which it
regulates a matter that a state might regulate in the absence of
federal legislation, reduces to that extent the area of legitimate
state regulation of or affecting interstate commerce. It prevents
the enforcement of any state regulation that conflicts with its
provisions, or that interferes with the realization of its objectives.66 And state regulation of the same subject matter may be
precluded, even though there is no direct conflict, provided a
congressional intent to occupy the field can be found." Such in63
Leisy v. Hardin, (1890) 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed.
128; Wabash, St. Louis & P. Ry. v. Illinois, (1886) 118 U. S. 557, 7 Sup.
Ct. 4, 30 L. Ed. 244, Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, (1925)
266 U. S. 405, 45 Sup. Ct. 176, 69 L. Ed. 352; (1940) 24 MININESOTA LAW
REVIEW 217.
64Baldwin v. Seelig Inc., (1935) 294 U. S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 497, 79
1032, 101 A. L. R. 55.
L. Ed.
65
1n re Raher, (1891) 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572:
Wisconsin State Fed. of Labor v. Simplex, (1934) 215 Wis. 623, 256 N. W.
56; (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 732.
6sUnited States, constitution, art. 6; Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law
(1940) 284; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator
Co., (1912) 226 U. S. 426, 33 Sup. Ct. 174, 57 L. Ed. 284, 46 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 203.
67Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., (1926) 272 U. S. 605, 47 Sup.
Ct. 207, 71 L. Ed. 432. In (1938) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 532, at p. 540 the
author says: "In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, actual
conflict or coincidence has provided the real test as to the supersedure of
the state act. Thus the extensive theories propounded in relation to con-
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tent, however, must be clearly manifested,6 s and depends much on
the nature of the subject matter. 9 The questions of conflict in
jurisdiction between the national and state legislation must be
examined with these constitutional provisions as a framework.
The first question that arises is: Has Congress evidenced an
intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of the slates?
As the state undoubtedly has the power to regulate labor
relations in the absence of federal legislation, 0 we must first
consider those factors that would tend to show a congressional
intent to occupy the field, the first of which is sec. 10 (a) of the
National Labor Act, providing that the board is to have exclusive power to prevent unfair labor practices. It has been argued
by two state courts7 in sustaining their acts that this provision
was aimed at preserving exclusive jurisdiction, to the exclusion
of the other federal agencies, and was not made with reference
to the state. This argument would appear to be sustained by an
examination of the Congressional Record7 - and would seem quite
logical in view of the fact that there were no state acts in
existence when the national act was passed.
The second factor that would tend to show a congressional
intent to occupy the field is the fact that the act contains no
saving clause. The state courts say that this factor should bear
but little weight, as there were no state acts in existence at the
time the federal act was passed. This argument is open to only
one objection, that is, that Congress purposely omitted the saving
clause, anticipating such legislation.
The third argument was that an inference of congressional
intent to occupy the field arose from the passage of complete
gressional 'occupation of the field,' despite the absence of conflict or coincidence, appear to find but limited support in the actual holdings." Cf. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Illinois, (1936) 298 U. S. 155, 56 Sup.
Ct 685, 80 L. Ed. 1099; Townsend v. Yeomans, (1937) 301 U. S. 441, 57
Sup. Ct. 842, 81 L. Ed. 1210; Kelly v. Washington, (1937) 302 U. S. 1;
58 Sup. Ct 87, 82 L. Ed. 3.
6sMintz v. Baldwin, (1933) 298 U. S. 346, 53 Sup. Ct. 611, 77 L. Ed.
1255; Kelly v. Washington, (1937) 302 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 87, 82 L. Ed. 3.
69Erie Ry. Co. v. New York, (1914) 233 U. S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. 756,
58 L. Ed. 1149, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 266.
7ORottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) sec. 243, pp. 500, 510.
nDavega City Radio, Inc. v. State Labor Relations Board, (1939)
281 N. Y. 13, 22 N. E. (2d) 145; Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v.
Fred Rueping Leather Co., (1938) 298 Wis. 473, 279 N. AV. 673, 117
A. L. R. 398.
72(1935) 79th Congressional Record 7569; 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; (1935)
H.R. Rep. 1147; 74 Cong.; 1st Sess. (1935) Senate Rep. No. 573; Mason's
U. S. Code, July 1935, Supp. Tit. 29, secs. 68 (3) 74; see (1940) 24 Mn\ESOTA LAW Ravmw 279.
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and detailed legislation in the particular field. This argument was
dismissed by the same courts in the following language:
"The states have an interest equally as important as that of
the federal government in the prevention of labor disputes and
practically the benefits to be gained from concurrent operation
in fields common to both far outnumber the advantage of mutually
exclusive laws.
"It cannot have been intended to paralyze the effort of a
state to protect her people against the impending calamity and to
commit the matter to a distant and overworked federal agency."?3
The above may be true, but if it is, the state courts are rather
slow in waking to what they call this impending calamity, as for
years they did nothing to advance the cause of collective bargaining.
Various factors that are said to indicate an intent not to preempt the field are that the board was given discretion as to whether
or not it could act in a particular case, and that the uncertainty
in the constitutionality and scope of the national act74 will for
years preclude effective administration by either state or national
governments.7 5 This latter argument can scarcely be said to
be evidence of congressional intent one way or the other.
It can be seen from an examination of the various factors involved that there is not much evidence of a congressional intent
one way or the other, and under the doctrine of Reid v. Colorado
and Mintz v. Baldwin the result would be reached that there was
no congressional intent to pre-empt the field.
As long as the state and federal acts embody the same principles, the differences in application of the two acts would not
seem to be so great that the courts would be compelled to reach
73

See cases cited in footnote 71; Garrison, Government and Labor. The
Latest Phase, (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 897. This argument was advanced
upon the theory that the state and federal laws were similar. Dean Garrison
in this article said, "Where jurisdiction is concurrent the national agency
will be enabled to leave the doubtful and less important cases to the state
boards, along with those of purely local significance. This will prevent delay
in administration, and will tend to assure that cases of peculiarly local importance will be handled by people well acquainted with local conditions."
74Davega City Radio, Inc., v. State Labor Relations Board, (1939)
281 N. Y. 13, 22 N. E. (2d) 145.
75
The first of these arguments is based on Mintz v. Baldwin, (1933)
289 U. S. 346, 53 Sup. Ct. 611, 77 L. Ed. 1255. But in that case the statute
expressly authorized state action if the national board was silent. It is also
important to note that in the railroad regulations cases the courts refused
to consider the validity of state orders until the matter had been presented
to and acted upon by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Napier v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., (1926) 272 U. S. 605, 47 Sup. Ct. 207, 71

L. Ed. 432.
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a different result.78 The National Labor Relations Board has
itself recognized the healthful purpose that the state act can
serve, and in their second annual report in 1937 it is stated:
"This trend of applying the principles embodied in the National Labor Relations Act to all industries, whether interstate
or intrastate, is a healthful one, and will undoubtedly become
more widespread. It is important that uniformity of legal principles and administrative policies be achieved, and the board hopes
to aid in achieving this result by means of conferences with various
state boards and by exchange of information."77
It is very important to note that when the national board made
this statement the only state acts in existence were those that
were copied from the Wagner Act, and that the board in this
paragraph stressed the need for uniformity. Such uniformity
could be substantially achieved if the acts were the same, even
though they were being administered by two different boards;
and it would be possible to arrange a system of cooperation
whereby all industry would be given coverage. 8
The second question to be determined is: Does a conflict
exist between the national act and the state act?
The first consideration is under what circumstances a conflict arises. This problem arose recently in Wisconsin under the
Wisconsin Employment Peace Act in the case of Allen Bradley
Local No. 1111 United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of
America v. Wisconsin Employnent Relations Board."D Chief Jus76(1940) 24 MiNNE-soTA LAw REvivw 277, 279. This note, however,
discussed the New York act, which was a state adaptation of the Wagner
Act. See Note, (1939) 27 Cal. L. Rev. 438, which-cites Dean Garrison in
(1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 897 (Supra footnote 75), wvith approval; and the
proceedings of the 23d convention of the International Association of Governmental Labor Officials, Dept. of Labor Bulletin 653 page 124. "The

identical ends of the federal and state statutes can be achieved by transfer
of cases and loan of personnel. Inasmuch as the same principles underlie
the laws covering both jurisdictions, it is only the disingenuous law violator
who 'will question either law by trying to distinguish between interstate and

intrastate commerce."
"Page 2.

7

8Thus the board in their annual report of 1938, page 3, noted that
they had been cooperating with the various state boards and had working

agreements with them as to the transfer of cases. They would also seem to

be cooperating in this state so far as possible, but most of this cooperation
seems to consist of one board not acting where the oth±r has entered the

picture, before deciding the question with the other board.

79(1940) 237 Wis. 164, 295 N. W. 791, The Wisconsin Employment

Relations Board found that the employees of the Allen Bradley Company

had committed certain practices that were unfair under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, and ordered them to cease and desist therefrom; an
action was commenced by Allen Bradley Local No. 1111, and several employees to review the order of the board. A judgment was entered affirming

this order, and this judgment was affirmed in the instant case by the Wis-
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tice Rosenberry, in a lengthy opinion, held that no conflict as to
j.urisdiction between the National Labor Relations Act and the
Wisconsin act existed, as the National Labor Relations Board
had not taken action in that particular case. He said:
"The vital question for consideration in this case is not
whether there is repugnance in the language of the two acts but
is one of jurisdiction between the state and federal government.
Inasmuch as the National Labor Relations Act depends for its
effective operation upon the determination of the National Labor
Relations Board, there can be no conflict between the acts until
they are applied to the same labor dispute.
"The appellants, while asserting that they do not do so, in
fact, argue this case as if the failure of Congress to define unfair
labor practices of employees operates as a license to employees in
the enforcement of their demands to do any or all of the things dedared by the Employment Peace Act to be unfair practices.
This argument stems from the idea that Congress is regulating
labor relations instead of interstate commerce."
Undoubtedly, this was the easiest way out of a difficult
problem, but it is submitted that the decision is based on a false
premise, i.e., that Congress was not trying to regulate labor
relations but was attempting to regulate interstate commerce.
The commerce clause, as has been pointed out, was the constitutional peg, but the real objective was the regulation of those labor
relations that could be regulated under the commerce clause. The
argument also overlooks the beneficial effect that the mere existence of the act has on industrial relations subject to its control.
Thus, one of the most important achievements of the act is its
effect on the employer-employee relationship generally. In other
words, when industries and employees see that the act will be enforced, they will abide by the provisions of the act and will
frame their industrial relations in accord with it.
Industry itself recognizes that this is true, and one of their
representatives, C. E. French,80 said:
"On the whole it may be said that the Wagner Act has
resulted in a marked improvement in personnel practices connected
with discharges and has contributed substantially to the security
of the wage earner by placing a curb on autocratic action by
consin supreme court. The Wisconsin act differs from the national act in
several important respects. It provides for unfair practices on the part of
employees, restricts picketing, and, in general, imposes greater limitations
on union activities.
8OPersonnel manager, Bayonne Works, Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey, 1922-1930; director of industrial relations Colonial Beacon Oil Co.,
1930-1935; (1938) 5 Law and Contemporary Problems 300.
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lucal managements and supervisory forces and by reinforcing the
efforts of personnel men to see that fair treatment is accorded."
The National Labor Relations Board in its annual report in
193981 stated that the act not only had led to a decrease in strikes
but had had a positive effect which could be seen in the increase
of written trade agreements which had occurred in the past few
years as collective bargaining procedures have been extended and
more widely accepted throughout American industry.
Judge Rosenberry ignores the positive effect of the national
act when he says:
"When the appellants concede that the state may punish unlawful acts of strikers who are engaged in striking because of
unfair labor practices of the employer, they concede the power
of the state to deal with some aspects of every labor dispute. In
the case of the National Labor Relations Act, the jurisdiction of
the federal authority is not aroused until such a situation has
arisen that interstate commerce is impeded or obstructed. On the
other hand, state action is regulatory and is designed to bring
about industrial peace, regular and adequate income for the employee, and uninterrupted production of goods and services for
the promotion of the general welfare. The federal act deals with
a situation that has arisen; the state act seeks to forestall
action
' 2
which may lead to disorder and loss of life and property. 8
Chief Justice Hugheq in the .hnes-Laughlin Case8 also recognized this positive effect when he said:
"If Congress deems certain recurring practices, though not
really a part of interstate commerce, likely to obstruct, restrain,
or burden it, it has the power to subject them to national supervision."
His position was reiterated in the Consolidated Edison Case,
where he declared:
"It cannot be maintained that the exertion of federal power
must await the disruption of commerce.,
"Congress was entitled to provide reasonable preventive measures and that was the object of the National Labor Relations
Act."

Even though jurisdiction may have to be determined by the
"courts as the cases arise, this jurisdiction is based on the fact
that an unfair labor practice in the particular industry will burden
interstate commerce;8- it is not based on the fact that the board
"'Fourth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, (1939) 4.
82(1940) 237 Wis. 164, 295 N. W. 791, 800.
83
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., (1937)
301 U.
S. 1, 40, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1352.
8
'United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 344,
42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762.
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took jurisdiction in the case. Jurisdiction existed because of the
fact that certain practices in that business would burden commerce, and when the board acted in that case, it merely decided
that that situation was one calling for the exercise of the jurisdiction.
By way of dictum in the Consolidated Edison Case,85 the
Supreme Court intimated that the question of whether the alleged unfair labor practices do actually threaten interstate or
foreign commerce in a substantial manner is necessarily presented, and in determining that factual question, regard should
be had to all the existing circumstances, including the bearing
and effect of any protective action to the same end already taken
under the state authority. That again, however, does not amount
to saying that no conflict in jurisdiction can arise until the
national board has actually acted, but is a recognition of the principle stated above that the applicability of the act to any industry
depends on existing circumstances and not upon action by the
board. A conflict can thus arise even though the national board
has not acted, if the state act has different objectives or different
means aimed at reaching the same objectives.
To determine the question as to whether there is such a conflict between the Minnesota act and the national act, the provisions of the two acts must be examined and compared. The employer unfair practices will be discussed first.
The National Labor Relations Act declares in sec. 7 that
employees shall have the right of self-organization, to form, join
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection. By sec. 8 (1) it is made an unfair labor practice to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the rights
guaranteed in sec. 7; and these rights are further protected by
sec. 8 (5), which provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees.
Under the Minnesota act, the employees are said to have the
same rights as exist under the national act, but no general sections similar to 8 (1) and 8 (5) are set up to protect these
rights by making the refusal to bargain, or the interference with
any of these rights which the employee is said to have, an unfair
85(1938) 305 U. S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126.
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labor practice. The sections of the Minnesota act dealing with

conciliation

6

are the only sections of the law that would extend

a similar protection, and these would protect those rights only in-

directly, and not to the same extent that the national act does.
These sections do not make it an unfair practice to refuse to
negotiate with an mployee or to refuse to come before the conciliator. The only possible sanction for a refusal to do either
would be a loss of benefits under the act, as under sec. 15, any
employee or employer who violates the provisions of the act is not
entitled to any of the benefits of the act in that labor dispute,
and shall not be entitled to injunctive relief with respect to any
matter growing out of that labor dispute.
Section 8 (2) of the national act provides that it is an unfair practice to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
support to it. The Minnesota act has no similar provision, and the

only deterrent to this practice, other than the protection that
12 (c) will give, is found in sec. 16 (b), which provides that

the labor conciliator shall not certify any labor organization which
is dominated, controlled, or maintained by an employer.
Under sec. 8 (3) of the national act, the employee is protected in his right to join labor unions by its being made an
unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage
membership in any union (labor organization) by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condiS61n brief, these sections provide that when either employer or employee wishes to change any existing agreement, or desires any changes
in rates of pay, working conditions, etc., a written notice of its demands
shall be given to the opposing party. It shall thereupon be the duty of the
parties to endeavor, in good faith, to reach an agreement. If no agreement

is reached in ten days, any employer may give notice of intention to strike

or lock out. It shall be unlawful for any labor organization or representative to institute or aid in the conduct of a strike, or for an employer to
institute a lockout, unless a notice has been served upon the labor conciliator and the other parties to the dispute at least ten days prior to the time
the strike or lockout is to become effective. Just what is meant by "duty"
has not as yet been settled by the State Supreme Court, but failure to
obey either of the above requirements could be found to be a lack of good
faith in attempting to reach an agreement and the offending party be denied
the benefits of the act until he had, in good faith, made use of all means
available under the act for the peaceful settlement of the dispute. This practice seems to have been followed in Ericson Oil Co. v. Filling Stations Attendants, Local 977 (Hennepin County District Court, 4th Judicial District)
where the court refused the employer an injunction against unlawful picketing because the employer had not endeavored, in good faith, to reach an
agreement with his employees. This case, however, can be justified on the
alternative ground that the employer had encouraged certain of the employees to join a company-dominated union.
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tion of employment. Employees receive the same protection under
the Minnesota act in sec. 12 (c).
Both the national act, sec. 8 (4), and the state act, sec. 12 (d),
provide that it shall be an unfair practice to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under the act.
The similarity in the unfair practices ends with these sections. In addition to the practices declared to be unfair on the
part of the employer under the national act, the Minnesota act
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice to institute a
lockout in breach of a valid collective bargaining agreement with
which the employees are complying in good faith, or to institute
a lockout in violation of sec. 6, requiring, in substance, notice of
intention to change a written agreement, ten days of negotiations,
and a ten day notice of intention to lock out.8
In sec. 12 (c) it is made an unfair labor practice to spy on
the activities of employees or their representatives. 88 And tinder
sec. 12 (f), any employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice
if he distributes or circulates any black list of individuals exercising any legal rights or of members of a labor organization for
the purpose of preventing individuals so blacklisted from ob8 9

taining or retaining employment.

In addition to the above, the only restriction imposed on the
employer is the requirement that before an employer-organization can be recognized by the conciliator, it must file with him a
statement with information concerning the organization.
If the unfair practices under the Minnesota act are held to
be applicable to an employer in interstate commerce, the most
burdensome restriction on the employer would be the possibility
of incurring penalties under both acts for the same practice, since
the Minnesota law does not go beyond the National Labor Relations Act in any important respect.90
87
In industries affected with a public interest, the governor is authorized
to appoint a commission to hear the dispute and submit a report. In theso
cases no strike can be called for a period of thirty days.
8sThis practice would also be unfair under the National Labor Relations
Act, In the matter of Montgomery Ward and Co., (1939) 17 N. L. R. B. 12,
asThis practice would also be unfair under the National Labor Relations Act, In the matter of the Federal Bakery, (1937) 4 N. L. R. B. 467.
O~Inasmuch as the initiative for a change in agreement is rarely, if
ever, taken by the employer, this requirement would not appear to be a
burdensome one upon the employer. The lockout provision is more burdensome, but only five notices were given from April 1939 to June 1940. The
question would, however, be substantially the same as it is in regard to
the employee unfair practices.
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Our questions are these: (1) Can the employer be subjected
to penalties under both acts? or (2) Does action by one preclude
action by the other? or further still, (3) Does the mere existence
of a national remedy preclude state action, or vice versa? For
example, could an employer be convicted of a misdemeanor, sued
for damages, and denied injunctive relief against unfair practices
of the employee under the state act, and be required by the
national board to obey a cease and desist order and to take affirmative action?
A dictum in the Consolidated Edison Case9 ' would seem to
point out the best means of solving this problem:
"When the employers are not themselves engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and the authority of the National
Labor Relations Board is invoked to protect that commerce from
interference or injury arising from the employer's intrastate activities, the question whether the alleged unfair labor practices do
actually threaten interstate or foreign commerce is necessarily
presented. And in determining that factual question, regard
should be had to all the existing circumstances including the bearing and effect of any protective action to the same end already
undertaken by the state authority. The justification for the exercise of the federal power should clearly appear. But the question
in such case would relate not to the existence of the federal power
but to the propriety of its exercise on a given state of facts."
This dictum makes the question solely one of propriety, and
does not go to the existence of the power to act. Thus, under
such a view, the mere existence of the state act would have no
effect at all. If the state had acted or had commenced proceedings
in a particular case, whether the National Labor Relations Board
would act would depend on the circumstances of the particular
case and whether they believed the policies of the National Labor

Relations Act had b.een substantially effectuated,' 2 but under no
-'Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (1938)
305 U. S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126. At the time this case
was heard by the National Labor Relations Board, the New York act had
been passed but had not as yet become effective. The Supreme Court sustained an order of the National Labor Relations Board which required the
employer to take certain affirmative action.
In (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 55, it is suggested that the mere existence of
the state act was not a sufficient reason to preclude'the national board from
acting, but where a proceeding has been commenced under the state act,
the national board, as a matter of comity, should defer its action until the
state board had acted. And once it was affirmatively shown that the state
board had actually acted, federal action would be precluded unless it could
be shox.n that a particular practice threatened interstate commerce. This
suggestion was limited, however, to those industries local in nature whose
activities
affect such commerce.
92
t is suggested in (1920) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 105 that the experience of
Australia, where the power over industrial relations was held to be co-
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circumstances could the state take away from the National Labor
Relations Board 93 the power to find that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice. 4
If the National Labor Relations Board had acted in a controversy and had found the employer to be guilty of an unfair labor
practice, and had ordered him to take certain action, the state
would be barred from giving further civil relief9 5 as far as cease
and desist orders or damages were concerned, as this would be
circumventing the policies of the National Labor Relations Act;
but the state could probably enforce the criminal penalty, 0 as
the United States has made no attempt to impose criminal penalties
for a violation of the unfair practices sectionsY9
The following unfair employee practices defined in the Minnesota act are those which give rise to the contention that its
object was different from that of the national act:
Sec. 11 (a) For any employee or labor organization to institute a strike if the calling of such strike is in breach of a valid
collective bargaining agreement;
(b) For any employee or labor organization to call a strike
ordinate, was undesirable even though legally acceptable because of the
confusion of conflicting and overlapping awards. See Union v. Abbot, (1928)
26 Commonwealth
Arbitration Ref. (Aus.) 489.
9
3United States constitution art. 6; Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law
(1939) sec. 243; Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 50, 42
Sup. 94Ct. 244, 66 L. Ed. 458.
This is on an analogy to Board of A. R. Commissioners of North
Dakota v. Great Northern Railway Co., (1930) 281 U. S. 412, 50 Sup,
Ct. 391, 74 L. Ed. 936; Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Ry,
Comm., (1936) 297 U. S. 471, 56 Sup. Ct. 536, 80 L. Ed. 810.
96Gavit, The Nature and Scope of the Commerce Power, (1934) 34
Col. L. Rev. 994, 996.
96United States v. Lanza, (1922) 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sup. Ct. 141, 67
L. Ed. 314; Herbert v. Louisiana, (1926) 272 U. S. 312, 47 Sup. Ct. 163,
71 L. Ed. 270; Gilbert v. Minnesota, (1920) 245 U. S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct.
125, 65 L. Ed. 287; but cf. Southern R. R. v. Railroad Comm'n, (1915)
236 U. S. 439, 35 Sup. Ct. 304, 59 L. Ed. 661. To do this the criminal proceeding would have to be interpreted as necessary to prevent breaches of
the peace. If it is used merely as an additional economic weapon, it is
hard to distinguish it from the provisions giving civil relief.
97It has been stated that no co-ordinate jurisdiction can exist in interstate commerce unless Congress expressly provides for it. Gavit, The
Nature and Scope of the Commerce Power (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 994. A
Note in (1940) 27 Cal. L. Rev. 438, suggests the following possibilities:
(1) Whichever takes jurisdiction retains exclusive jurisdiction; (2) Coordinate orders existing at the same time; (3) Give both jurisdiction until
the National Labor Relations Board has acted; (4) Co-existing powers to
issue orders, but the National Labor Relations Board's order controlling
in case of conflict. It is submitted that the third possibility is the most acceptable from both an economic and legal standpoint. Each of the above
assumes that the provisions of the two acts are similar, and that is the
basis on which the discussion has proceeded thus far.
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in violation of sections 6 or 7, or to violate the provisions of a
valid collective bargaining agreement;
(c) For any person to seize or occupy property unlawfully
during the existence of a labor dispute;
(d) For any person to picket or cause to be picketed a place
of employment of which place said person is not an employee
while a strike is in progress, unless a majority of the pickets are
employees of said place of employment;
(e) For more than one person to picket or cause to be picketed
a single entrance to any place of employment where no strike is
in progress at the time;
(f) For any person to interfere in any manner with the
operation of a vehicle or the operator thereof when neither the
owner nor the operator is at the time a party to the strike;
(g) For an employee or labor organization to compel or
attempt to compel any person to join or refrain from joining any
labor organization or strike against his will by any threatened
or actual unlawful interference with his person, immediate family or physical property, or to assault or unlawfully threaten any
such person while in the pursuit of lawful employment.
Sec. 13: It shall be unlawful for any person at any time to
interfere with the free and uninterrupted use of public roads,
etc., or to wrongfully obstruct ingress to and egress from any
business or place of employment.
In determining whether there is a difference in objectives, it
is permissible to start with the premise that the state cannot take
away from the National Labor Relations Board the power to
find that the employer has committed an unfair labor practice,
and to make the employee whole if such an unfair practice is
found. Thus, although it has been held by the National Labor
Relations Board that an entire repudiation of a collective bargaining agreement is a sufficient reason for an employer to discharge an employee,9" the board never has tried to enforce collective bargaining agreements generally, nor have they held an insignificant breach by an employee to be a sufficient reason for his
discharge. 9 Now, under sec. 11 (a) of the Minnesota act, if an
employee went out on strike, contrary to the terms of this section, or violated the terms or conditions of such agreement, he
would lose the benefits of the Minnesota act, and it would appear
that the strike (or some features of it) could be enjoined, and
that the employer could sue for damages for the breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. 0 0 But it does not follow from
98National Labor Relations Board v. Sands, (1939) 306 U. S. 332,
59 Sup. Ct 508, 83 L. Ed. 682.
99(1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 974 approves this holding of the board.
10oChernov, The Labor Injunction in Minnesota, (1940) 24 MINzSoTA LAW RmFvw 792.
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this that the National Labor Relations Board would be precluded
thereafter from finding that, in fact, the contract had been entered
into with an employer-dominated union.l1

This would be true even though a Minnesota court had found
the contract to be valid and had allowed recovery for its breach.
Nor would it preclude finding that the real reason for the discharge of the employees was their union activities and, thus,
that they would be entitled to be reinstated with such affirmative
relief as the national board might consider necessary to effectuate
the policies of the act. This recovery would necessarily include
any damages recovered by the employer in the state court, and
thus the state action would be nullified, and the employee would
have been subjected to this penalty during the interim. To reach
any other decision would be to give the state supremacy in the
field of interstate commerce. This same reasoning holds true for
all of the unfair practices on the part of the employees, and, as
a result, in many cases state relief to the employer would be
effectively taken away. Thus, even though sec. 11 (b) of the state
act can be sustained as a valid limitation on the right to strike, 102
in so far as the due process clause is concerned, the National
lOlAmendments to the Wagner Act, (1939) 7 Int. Jurid. Ass'n Bulletin
85-91; Frey, The National Labor Relations Act Should Not Be Amended at
the Present Session of Congress, (1939) 33 I1. L. Rev. 658; (1939) 52
Harv. L. Rev. 970.
02
The validity of sec. 11 (d) and (e) has been urged, Chernov, The
Labor Injunction in Minnesota, (1940) 24 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 792,
on the basis that these regulations have a reasonable relation to the prevention of violence and can thus be sustained under the police power.
(1939) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 118. Since these discussions, the Supreme Court
has clearly identified the right to picket with the freedom of speech,
Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 659;
and a recent case note in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA LAW REvEw 238 has
expressed doubts as to the validity of sec. 11 (d), forbidding picketing
unless a majority of the pickets are employees, and sec. 13, which prohibits
interference with the use of the public streets, highways, or methods of
transportation. Such doubts would appear to be well-founded, in view of
the recent case of Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Furworkers
Union, (D.C. 1939) 105 Fed. (2d) 1, where an injunction against picketing
by a minority union after the majority had entered into an agreement with
the employer was refused. Accord, Blankenship v. Kaufman, (C.C.A. 7th
Cir. 1938) 92 F. (2d) 450, 453; cf. Donnelly Garment Co. v. Internation
L. G. W. Union, (W.D. Mo.) (1937) 21 Fed. Supp. 807, affd. 308 U. S.
522, 60 Sup. Ct. 292, 84 L. Ed. 443. But cf. Oberman & Co. v. United
Garment Workers of America, (D. Mo. 1937) 21 Fed. Supp. 20; and the
two recent Supreme Court cases, Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, (1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 552; American Federation of
Labor v. Swing, (1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 568; discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEW 640.
If the courts allow an injunction against all picketing because of a
breach of secs. 11 (a) or (b) even though the picketing is otherwise
within the limits of (d) and (e), it would meet with the same objection.
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Labor Relations Board could still give relief for employer unfair
labor practices.
Therefore, granted that the state cannot legalize employerconduct or take away from the National Labor Relations Board
the power to award relief to the employee, the most important
question is: Do these unfair practices operate so as to interfere
with the objectives of the National Labor Relations Act? We
have seen that the states have a valid interest to protect and
that the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, by itself,
is not enough to divest states of the right to prescribe regulations
under the state police power; but we have also noted that Congress has the power to legislate in this field, and that if there is a
conflict, the federal regulation will prevail. A conflict can also
arise if the state act will so interfere that the purpose of the
national act cannot be accomplished, or its operation within its
chosen field frustrated.1 03 It is not necessary that the state act
specifically limit some of the rights granted by the federal government or purport to take away some of the remedies.
It has been noted that the purpose of Congress was to lay
what it considered to be an essential foundation for industrial
relations. In laying this foundation, certain elements, thought
by Congress to be necessary to achieve harmonious industrial
relations, were included, and certain others, thought to be unnecessary, were left out. The act was passed, not as a new experiment, but as the result of many years experience in the field of
labor relations.
"Indeed, Congress has time and again passed acts designed
to give labor the bargaining power of which it had been deprived
long ago in England by the ancient statutes of laborers. But as
often as Congress has attempted to restore to labor this
10 lost
bargaining power, the decisions have construed it away." '
1OlSavage v. Jones, (1912) 225 U. S. 501, 32 Sup. Ct. 715, 50 L. Ed.
1182; Hines v. Davidowitz, (1941) 312 U. S. 52, 61 Sup. Ct. 399.
04

Geffs and Hepburn, The Wagner Labor Act Cases, (1938) 22
LAW REviEW 2, see footnote 23. "In a striking series of cases
decided between 1908 and 1923, the Supreme Court nullified a variety
MINNESOTA

of efforts on the part of Congress to benefit the working classes. These

decisions dealt in a manner uniformly adverse to the interest of labor and
favorable to the actual or apparent interests of business."
With respect to the approach of the Supreme Court to the National
Labor Relations Act, the court has adhered to the third of three typical
approaches to statutory construction: (1) the literal or plain meaning
approach, in which the court does not go beyond the four walls of the
statute unless an ambiguity arises; (2) the Golden Rule, which permits

a departure from literal .or plain meaning if an absurd result would be
reached by interpreting the statute literally; and (3) the mischief approach, in which the court interprets the statute in the light of the mischief
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At the time of the passage of the act it was criticized by some
persons as one-sided and unfair, but this argument was rejected
by the Supreme Court in the Jones-Laughlin Case,10 where it
was said:
"We are dealing with the power of Congress, not with a particular policy or with the extent to which the policy should go."
And Congress has rejected various equalizing amendments
which have been proposed, 00 and has, even in the face of the
present emergency, turned down a proposal (the Vinson bill) requiring employees to give a notice of intent to strike in defense
industries.
The argument is made that the national act was passed to encourage collective bargaining, and as the Minnesota act purports
to do the'same thing, one cannot look around beyond the words
of the national act or of the state act. But this is not true. Collective bargaining cannot be considered in an abstract sense. One
must go beyond mere words and see what Congress intended to
guarantee. This can be discovered only by looking to the factors
which we already have considered. The definition of the words
"collective bargaining" will tend to bear this out, for they have
been defined as "the way by which the insignificant bargaining
power of the individual is increased and a better balance of the
economic forces of capital and labor in industrial relations can
which it was intended to remedy. See Willis, Statute Interpretation in a
Nut Shell, (1938) 16 Can. Bar. Rev. 1, 12. In construing the scope and
effect of the National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court has generally adopted the mischief approach and has made use of various extrinsic
aids to interpretation. Thus, Justice Stone in the National Labor Relations
Board v. the Fansteel Corporation, (1939) 300 U. S. 240, 263, 59 Sup. Ct.
990, 83 L. Ed. 627, says: "The National Labor Relations Act, as its purpose and scope are disclosed by its preamble and operative provisions,
explained by the reports of the Congressional Committees recommending
its enactment, Report No. 573, Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. Report No. 1147, House Committee on Labor, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., is aimed at securing the peaceable settlement of labor
disputes." Cf. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, (1939) 310 U. S.469, 60 Sup.

Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 3111, holding that the Sherman Act prohibited conspiracies to obstruct interstate transportation only when in purpose or effect
they will or do result in a form of market control of a commodity such as
to monopolize the supply; thus it was not applicable to strikers who
refused to permit shipment of already completed hosiery to fill orders in
interstate commerce. In the case the Court went into an extensive discussion of the history of the Sherman Act and the purpose which they

gathered from the above sources.

lOsNational Labor Relations Board v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp.,
(1937) 301 U. S.1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1352.
06See hearing before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
S 2926-73 Congress, 2d sess.; (1939) 7 Int. Jurid. Ass'n Bull. 85, 91.

LABOR RELATIONS

be reached."'1 7 Thus, what Congress did by the National Labor
Relations Act was to establish what it considered to be the proper
balance between capital and labor; and a state regulation which
destroys this balance is just as inapplicable to industries in interstate commerce as if it had expressly taken away one of the rights
granted under the National Labor Relations Act.
The state is not deprived of its police power by the national
act, but if it attempts to exercise this power in such a way that
it in effect upsets the balance established by the national act, its
legislation is not applicable to industries in interstate commerce.
The Minnesota act, by putting limitations on the right to strike
and the right to picket, undoubtedly has restricted union activities.
If these various provisions can be sustained as having a reasonable relationship to the prevention of violence, they can be applied
to industries in interstate commerce. But if they go further and
restrict the economic strength of the unions or the employees on
the theory that such restrictions are necessary to promote equality
of bargaining power and harmonious industrial relations, they
cannot be applied to industries in interstate commerce, because to
allow such regulations would be to allow the state to interfere with
the objectives of the national act.
This principle was well illustrated by the recent case of Kelly
01
v. Washington,"
where the United States Supreme Court sustained a state statute providing that certain boats could be inspected for seaworthiness by state authorities, even though the
federal government had previously provided extensive regulations.
The Court said:
"We have found that in relation to the inspection of the hull
and the machinery of these tugs in order to insure safety and seaworthiness, there is a field in which the state law could operate
without coming into conflict with the present federal laws. If,
however, the state goes beyond what is plainly essential to safety
and seaworthiness, the state will encounter the principle that such
requirements, if imposed at all, must be through the action of
Congress in a uniform rule."
The history of the Minnesota act109 would lead one to believe
that these restrictions have a broader purpose than the prevention
of violence. They were inserted by the so-called "farm bloc," and
o17Riesenfeld, Recent Development of French Labor Law, (1939)

23

MiNxEsoTA LAv REvIEw 407; for other definitions see Warm, Judicial Atti-

tude Towards Unions, (1939) 23 MINNEsoT. LAW REvmw 340.
108(1937) 302 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 87, 82 L. Ed. 3.
lOoSee (1940) 24 MINNESoTA LAw REvIEw 217, for a comprehensive
history of the passage of the act.
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were not contained in the bills offered by the bar association or
the labor unions. Apparently, their purpose was tooset forth
disapproval of certain acts hitherto committed by labor and to
provide for a means of limiting certain activities viewed by the
"farm bloc" as detrimental to peaceful industrial relations. If
their purpose was limited to the prevention of violence and intimidating activities on the part of labor, the restrictions were unnecessary, as these practices have always been subject to injunction
under the common law. The soundness 1 0 of that position was
recognized in the Labor Disputes Injunction Act of 1933.111
Thus, these provisions would seem to be an entrance by the
state into the field of collective bargaining in an attempt to promote
the settlement of disputes and the prevention of these disputes
by setting up certain standards of conduct for employees and
employers. In so far as these standards are different from those
set up under the national act, and in so far as they go beyond
the prevention of violence and intimidation, they are attempts by
the state to establish what it considers to be the proper balance
between labor and industry.
The unions themselves feel that the legislation has this effect,11 2
and that it takes away from them certain powerful weapons and
thus deprives them of their economic strength at the bargaining
table. This is especially true of sections 11 (a), 11 (b), and
11 (d), which the unions claim have no reasonable relationship
to the prevention of violence.
IV. SUMMARY
It is submitted that the requirements of the Minnesota act
which change the relative economic strength of the parties should
not be applied to industries in interstate commerce. By the
national act Congress has increased the economic strength of the
employees and of the unions, and if the local regulations are
sustained, the state would be decreasing that economic strength.
Even if it be argued that the state has not cut down the relative
strength of the parties, it has endeavored to establish what it
considered to be the proper balance between employers and employees, and in doing this has changed the requirements that
Congress has considered necessary to establish this balance, and the
"1OChernov, The Labor Injunction in Minnesota, (1940) 24 MINNESOTA
LAw REVIEW 792.
"'Mason's Minn. Stats., 1940 supp., secs. 4260-1-4260-15.
11230 Commonweal, Sept. 29, 1939; Proceedings of the 57th Convention
of the Minnesota State Federation of Labor 95.
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state provisions must fall for that reason. This is necessarily true
since Congress is the sole judge, not only of the proper balance
between labor and capital, but also as to how that balance shall
be established.
This result might not appear to be desirable, as it involves a
degree of centralization that may be viewed by many with alarm;
but it must follow if Congress is to have the supreme power to
regulate labor relations in the field of interstate commerce.
If it is argued that the state can impose restrictions and limitations beyond those which the federal government considers necessary, and beyond those necessary for the protection of the public
peace, the nation will be faced with the problem of forty-eight
different labor laws in as many states, and uniformity would become impossible. In addition, the states would be in a position to
nullify the efforts of Congress to create equality of bargaining.
The fact that the national board would not be precluded from acting, even if the state board had acted, would not be sufficient
protection. In the interim the employer, or the employee, as the
case may be, would be forced by practical necessity to obey the
state order, and would be prejudiced to such an extent that a
reversal of the order by the federal board would be of little help.
And, most important of all, the positive effect of the national act
would be necessarily limited.
Unless a third alternative is found, the Supreme Court's recognition that Congress could regulate labor relations in interstate
commerce raises this dilemma: If the regulations of the states are
sustained as applied to interstate commerce, it will be impossible
to obtain uniformity of regulation among the states; yet if the
regulations are held not applicable, there will be a lack of uniformity as applied to industries within the same state.
In search of the -way out,13 it is possible to consider federalism
from another point of view. Instead of regarding our two governmental centers as independent agencies, each jealous of any
encroachment by the other, we may regard them as mutually
113
Clark, Federal and State Cooperation in Labor Legislation, (1937)
27 Am. Labor Legis. Rev. 167; Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation
Under the Constitution, (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 752. Suggested means are:
(1) Inducement through information; (2) Federal grants in aid by way of
inducement; (3) A tax credit device on the nature of the Social Security
program; (4) Interstate compacts; (5) Reciprocal legislation; (6) Interstate regional planning; (7) Forbidding transportation in interstate commerce of goods produced or shipped into a state in violation of state laws;
(8) The utilization of the state administrative agencies by the Federal
Government
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supplementary agencies, best performing their task through coordinated effort. Thus, through the current exercise of their
respective powers, the federal and state governments could
broaden the sum total of legislative power applicable to a given
problem and call into action their combined administrative agencies
and facilities.
To do this it is necessary that the two agencies have a common
starting point. It is submitted that it is possible to achieve this
by regarding labor relations as primarily a national problem, solution of which requires incidentally protecting local interests. Those
interests can best be safeguarded by having a local administration
of a uniform national law, an administration which would be in
a position to temper that law to meet the interests of each com14
munity.
11
4Under such a view, the public peace would, of course, be protected
by the state police agencies. No separate treatment was given in the body
of this note to the sections dealing with conciliation and the selection of
proper representatives for bargaining. The Norris LaGuardia Act, Act of
March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. at L. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. 101-115, 2 Mason's
U. S. Code, tit. 29, sees. 101-115, contains a provision for the appointment of
federal conciliators. Under this provision there is no waiting period, and
the whole proceeding is voluntary. The fact that the state conciliator is
already acting in the case will not prevent the federal conciliator from
entering the dispute; in fact, the two often cooperate in the same labor
dispute. The more important question is, Do the parties have to give the
statutory notice required under the Minnesota act?
It has been pointed out that the provision requiring a ten-day notice
of intention to strike and making it an unfair practice unless this is done
is probably not applicable to industries in interstate commerce. However,
the provision in the Minnesota act, requiring a written notice of an intent
to change an existing agreement, or to negotiate a new agreement, and
the provision requiring the parties to meet with the conciliator to attempt
to reach an agreement could be applied to industries in interstate commerce, as no attempt is made in these sections to give economic strength
to either side; nor is there an attempt to destroy what Congress considered
the proper balance between industry and labor. There is also no attempt
made by these provisions to impose a penalty for the failure to abide by

them.

In the collective bargaining sections of the respective acts there are
the following differences: (1) Under the state act an existent craft unit
must be designated as the appropriate unit, and under the national act
the National Labor Relations Board can designate whatever unit it
thinks will effectuate the purposes of the act; (2) Under the state act no
industry-wide bargaining unit is possible unless all the employers agree,
and under the national act such a unit is possible even though the employers are against having such a unit; (3) Under the state act both
employer and employees can petition to have the bargaining agent certified,
and under the national act only the employees have this right. All these
rights would appear to be substantial and appear to change the rights of
the various parties; they would therefore be subject to the same limitations
as the unfair practices considered.

